At Oasis Foundation, we take security very seriously and we deeply appreciate any effort to discover and fix vulnerabilities in Oasis Core and other projects powering the Oasis Network.

We prefer that security reports be sent through our private bug bounty program linked on our website.

We sketch out the general classification of the kinds of errors below. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list.


Our papers specify what we are building. Additional designs and specifications may be made available later.

NB: Our designs/specifications describe what we are building toward, and do not necessarily reflect the state of the current iteration of the system. Implementation/specification mismatches in such cases are expected.

  • Conceptual errors.

  • Ambiguities, inconsistencies, or incorrect statements.

  • Mismatch between specifications and implementation of any subsystems / modules, when the implementation is considered complete.

Contract Computational/Data Integrity

  • Race conditions / non-determinism. These may introduce a denial of service opportunity, or a way to force the system into slow path / recovery mode.

  • Conditions under which compute nodes may cause a bogus transaction result to be accepted (committed to the blockchain) by the system.


  • Tendermint has its own vulnerability disclosure policy and bug bounty, so in general issues in the core tendermint code should be reported there.

  • Oasis Labs code that misuses Tendermint code, i.e., in violation of API/contract, would definitely be in scope.

Discrepancy Detection

  • Situations where a discrepant computation is not detected.

  • Situations where a discrepancy occurs but no receipts are generated/retained for blame assignment / slashing after slow-path recovery.


  • We use immutable authenticated data structures.

    • Undetected mutations. E.g., situations where a conceptually immutable data structure can be changed without updating hashes (and thus getting a new ID).

    • Missing/incomplete ADS proof generation or verification.

  • Availability failures. Potential DoS, e.g., malformed requests that cause node panics, etc.

Contract Confidentiality

  • Cryptography: information leak or integrity failure, e.g., due to a poor choice of signature algorithm, AEAD schemes, etc, or to improper usage of the cryptographic schemes. NB: side channels are out of scope.

  • TEE misuse, model failures.


Bugs that create a potential for DOS or DDOS attack, e.g.:

  • Amplification attacks.

  • Failstop crashes / panics.

  • Deadlocks / livelocks.